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Unsurprisingly, this thesis has become 
quite controversial, with responses 
dividing along familiar partisan lines. 
Many people on the political left were 
cheered by the apparently scientific 
evidence of the badness of inequality 
(Wilkinson and Pickett themselves wanted 
to call their book ‘Evidence-based politics’ 
(p.ix)), while many people on the political 
right attacked what they saw as the book’s 
misleading use of statistics (Saunders, 
2010; Snowdon, 2010). The debate has 
become quite polarized, with attributions 
of bad faith on both sides (The Spirit 
Level: Spooking the Right  2010; see also 
the responses by Snowdon and Saunders 
in the letters section of the Guardian, 28 
July 2010). 
I do not aim to adjudicate this 
debate in this paper, though I should 
note that some critiques of Wilkinson 
and Pickett’s research do seem to raise 
valid points that at the very least would 
qualify their claims. Thus, for example, 
the associations they report are often 
not robust to the inclusion or exclusion 
of particular countries or to controls for 
per capita income, and cultural factors 
potentially underlying both income 
inequality and health and social outcomes 
are not properly explored (Saunders, 
2010; O’Connell, 2010). And some recent 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have argued recently 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010) that income inequality 
produces many kinds of social and health problems in 
rich countries.1 High rates of infant mortality, teenage 
births, crime and obesity, educational under-achievement, 
low life expectancy, social mobility and many other social 
problems are worse, they claim, in more unequal societies. 
They further argue that these problems are caused not by 
absolute deprivation (poverty) but by relative deprivation, 
and that they are best addressed by compressing the income 
distribution, even if this means slowing or entirely stopping 
economic growth. Moreover, their argument has the further 
implication that more could be done for underprivileged 
groups in society by reducing the gap between the rich and 
the poor than by investing more resources in public services. 
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research on the relationship between 
inequality and health over time has not 
confirmed the Wilkinson and Pickett 
thesis (Leigh, Jencks and Smeeding, 2009). 
Nevertheless, I would not be surprised if 
something like the Wilkinson and Pickett 
thesis is reasonably close to the truth. 
Even if some of the particular studies or 
correlations they use overstate the effects 
of income inequality, it is the cumulative 
evidence that matters, and this cumulative 
picture does seem to suggest that high 
levels of income inequality are at the very 
least associated with bad social outcomes, 
though the exact effect of inequality in 
producing such outcomes, and the ways 
in which inequality interacts with other 
factors (including culture and economic 
growth), remain obscure. So in what 
follows I will simply assume that there is 
an association between income inequality 
and various bad social outcomes, though 
I remain agnostic on both its magnitude 
and the exact mechanism that may 
cause it, and in particular on whether, as 
Wilkinson and Pickett argue, increased 
stress caused by status competition in 
income unequal societies is to blame.
But even if Wilkinson and Pickett are 
correct that inequality (and not simply 
poverty) causes many sorts of social 
and health problems, there can still be 
reasonable debate about the appropriate 
level of income inequality in a society 
and about the permissibility of various 
means to achieve equality. In particular, I 
argue that in a democratic society which 
values individual freedom, there will be 
sometimes less reason to worry about 
income inequality and more reason to 
worry about other forms of inequality.
Political philosophy and political 
theory normally investigate issues of 
inequality through the lenses provided 
by the concepts of justice, freedom and 
power. Yet Wilkinson and Pickett do not 
typically speak of income inequality as just 
or unjust.  Their case against inequality 
is instead presented in straightforwardly 
consequentialist terms, and articulated 
without much reference to ideas of 
justice (the word only appears in their 
book in the context of the criminal 
justice system). Nevertheless, they clearly 
believe that the consequences of income 
inequality are unjust (see, for example, 
p.84), and it is clear that Wilkinson and 
Pickett would agree with the view that 
income inequality is unjust, not merely 
deplorable (see, for example, pp.247-9, 
where they mention our natural intuitions 
about fairness), even if only on account 
of its consequences. But I shall argue 
that if the question concerns the justice 
of income inequality, then, contrary to 
Wilkinson and Pickett’s hopes for an 
‘evidence-based politics’, there can be 
no ‘scientific’ determination of the right 
level of inequality in a society. Though 
evidence of the deleterious effects of 
inequality should be incorporated into 
public debate, ultimately the appropriate 
level of income inequality in a society 
is a moral question on which citizens 
will reasonably disagree, not a scientific 
question that can be settled more or less 
objectively. 
In what follows, I provide a ‘map’ 
of the different views one might have 
about the justice or injustice of income 
inequality from the perspective of 
political philosophy and political theory. 
The terrain that the conceptual lenses 
provided by the concepts of power, 
freedom and justice reveal is complex 
and highly contested, and I cannot do 
more than provide a small glimpse of the 
problems involved in thinking about the 
relationship between income inequality 
and questions of justice, freedom and 
power. I stick closely to those views I 
consider significant and plausible, and 
point out some of their broad policy 
implications along the way, but I do not 
claim comprehensiveness. I nevertheless 
argue that the most plausible views of 
justice indicate that income inequality is 
not always unjust.
Is income equality always desirable? 
In order to isolate what we think is 
valuable about income equality, it is 
worth looking at a negative example: the 
communist societies of Eastern Europe. 
These societies typically had a very low 
level of income inequality: the average of 
estimates of the Gini coefficient in a set of 
communist societies for which data exists 
in the period 1960–1993 is about 0.24, 
much lower than the average 0.34 for a set 
of rich capitalist societies throughout that 
same period, and the level of measured 
income inequality in communist societies 
is almost always below that of rich 
societies.2 Moreover, although most of 
these communist societies were not as rich 
as Western European democracies (and 
the gap grew over time), some of them 
did achieve high levels of development 
measured both by GDP per capita and by 
other indicators.3 Evidence also indicates 
that citizens in these societies believed 
that high levels of income inequality 
were unjustified and preferred a low 
level of income inequality (Gijsberts, 
2002). Yet most of us would agree that 
the mechanism through which income 
equality was achieved in these cases 
violated rights that we would consider 
to be fundamental. More importantly, 
these societies were not really equal in an 
important sense of the term: although 
income differentials didn’t matter much 
for ordinary social life, inequalities of 
political access mattered enormously. 
Where money does not matter much for 
social life, other inequalities – of political 
access, class background and the like – can 
assume a tremendous importance. Indeed, 
although citizens in Eastern Europe 
thought income equality was generally a 
good thing, they did not think these other 
inequalities were legitimate or that income 
equality in any way compensated for these 
I argue that in a democratic society which values 
individual freedom, there will be sometimes less 
reason to worry about income inequality and more 
reason to worry about other forms of inequality.
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other inequalities (for some evidence in 
the case of the GDR, see Pfaff, 2006).
The point of this example is not 
to ridicule any concern with income 
inequality, or to suggest that the only 
way of achieving equality is to turn the 
country into a communist dictatorship. 
After all, the levels of equality in Sweden 
or Japan – the countries that Wilkinson 
and Pickett single out as the most equal 
in their sample – can be achieved within 
the framework of a typical capitalist 
economy through taxes and transfers 
(within the limits given by the efficiency 
losses induced by high taxes, available 
technologies of tax evasion, the political 
resistance of the rich, and the malleability 
of cultural ideas about what constitutes 
‘excessive’ taxation). Nevertheless, the 
example serves to indicate that we care 
about more than mere income inequality: 
we also care about both the processes 
through which income equality and 
inequality are generated, and about the 
pattern of other inequalities in society, 
especially inequalities that result in what 
we might call ‘unequal citizenship’. To 
the extent that the process that allocates 
incomes is perceived as fair, then the 
resulting distribution will be seen as 
less problematic (and vice versa). And, 
similarly, to the extent that inequalities 
in income are not seen to be implicated 
in inequalities of power and status which 
result in domination, they will also appear 
as less problematic (and vice versa).4 
Stated positively though abstractly, we 
might say that an equal society is a society 
in which the process that results in the 
allocation of incomes to individuals is fair, 
i.e. it respects their equal moral worth, 
and this distribution is not implicated in 
hierarchies of domination which diminish 
the worth of their equal citizenship. It is 
not necessarily a society with a high level 
of income equality, though it may well 
be the case that high or rising levels of 
income inequality provide evidence (not 
necessarily decisive) that something has 
gone wrong with the process of allocation 
or the relationship between income and 
other social goods. 
Three views 
The key to the question of the justice of 
income equality or inequality, then, lies 
both in what we mean by a ‘fair’ process 
for the allocation of incomes in a society, 
and in how we conceive of the relationship 
between income inequality and other 
forms of inequality in a given society. 
From this point of view, we can think of 
three kinds of reasons for claiming that 
income inequality is unjust.
1 First, we might think that income 
inequality is unjust because it is 
currently produced by an unfair 
system of allocation, regardless of 
any bad health or social problems 
inequality might cause (that is, 
whether or not Wilkinson and Pickett 
are correct in thinking that income 
inequality produces all sorts of health 
and social problems). This may be 
because of contingent features of the 
economic system (perhaps historical 
expropriation, or current corruption) 
or it may be, more radically, because 
(we may think) the sort of market 
system of allocation prevailing today 
rewards people ultimately for things 
they have no control over (like their 
good genes and talents, or their good 
upbringing, or the fact that they were 
born in a well-governed country, or 
even their propensity for hard work), 
above and beyond any other historical 
or current injustices that affect the 
distribution of income and wealth. 
  Though this latter position 
may appear remote from common 
beliefs, it should be noted that it has 
substantial philosophical support. 
For example, the philosopher John 
Rawls argued that ‘[t]here is no more 
reason to permit the distribution of 
income and wealth to be settled by 
the distribution of natural assets than 
by historical and social fortune’ and 
that ‘[t]hose who have been favored 
by nature, whoever they are, may gain 
from their good fortune only on terms 
that improve the situation of those 
who have lost out’, since society is a 
system of co-operation set up for the 
benefit of all (Rawls, 1999, pp.64, 87). 
Later philosophers developed these 
observations into a more systematic 
theory of what has come to be called 
‘luck egalitarianism’ (Cohen, 2000, 
2008; Dworkin, 1981; Arneson, 1989; 
Parijs, 1995; the term was invented by 
a critic, Anderson, 1999). If the rich 
man who inherits his money cannot 
be said to ‘deserve’ that money (he 
is just lucky), why should a person 
whose skills are suddenly in demand 
be said to deserve the income he or 
she earns on that basis, especially 
since our talents and skills themselves 
depend to a large degree on things we 
inherited and on the complementary 
skills of others? But, luck egalitarians 
say, a fair system of allocation cannot 
reward people differentially on the 
basis of morally irrelevant features; 
it can only reward or punish them 
for those acts for which they are fully 
responsible (perhaps only hard work 
after adulthood, though even this is 
doubtful if the propensity for hard 
work is inherited).  
  In practice, this means either that 
the rules of social interaction should 
be set up so that any inequalities 
are always to the advantage of the 
worst-off group in society (that is, if 
inequalities exist at all, they should be 
... the desired remedy is not for the wealthy to 
compensate the poor, ... something that might 
make other sorts of resources ‘dominant’, but to 
break the connection between income and other 
important goods ... and in general to prevent the 
emergence of dominant hierarchies.
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such that getting rid of the inequality 
would make the worst-off group in 
society even worse off: this is Rawls’ 
‘difference principle’) or (assuming 
a market society) that the wealthy 
should compensate the poor for their 
ill fortune. The specific remedies 
proposed by people in this tradition 
vary, but they include such ideas as a 
‘universal basic income’ (Parijs, 1995) 
and a significant degree of industrial 
reorganisation (including workers’ 
control of enterprises, a solution 
favored by Rawls as well as Wilkinson 
and Pickett in The Spirit Level, pp.522-
63).5 
2 Second, we might think that even if 
current levels of income inequality 
are not produced by an unfair 
system of allocation, such inequality 
is nevertheless unjust to the degree 
to which money is transformed 
into social status, political power, 
educational achievement and the like: 
that is, to the degree to which income 
inequality produces other important 
inequalities and thus enables social 
and political domination (Walzer, 
1983). But here the desired remedy 
is not for the wealthy to compensate 
the poor (that is, to simply equalise 
income), something that might make 
other sorts of resources ‘dominant’, 
but to break the connection between 
income and other important goods 
(including political power and social 
status) and in general to prevent the 
emergence of dominant hierarchies. 
Somebody concerned about the 
dominant role of income in social 
life might thus advocate for some 
degree of redistribution, but also for 
the regulation of money in politics, 
public provision of high-quality, 
universal education and healthcare, 
and the like. Income inequality might 
still exist in such a society, but it 
would not translate into other sorts 
of important inequalities (including 
the sorts of inequalities in health or 
education that Wilkinson and Pickett 
describe). Moreover, somebody who 
held this view would be wary of 
solutions which equalised income 
only to make other inequalities (in 
access to political power, for example) 
more salient.
3 Finally, we might think (like 
Wilkinson and Pickett) that income 
inequality is unjust to the degree that 
it produces bad social outcomes for 
everyone, not just for the worst off 
in society (see especially chapters 1, 13 
and 14), even if the process through 
which the inequality is generated can 
be generally considered fair and even 
if it is not particularly associated with 
other sorts of significant inequalities, 
like inequalities in political power 
(something which Wilkinson and 
Pickett do not necessarily believe: see 
chapter 15, especially pp.249-52). The 
argument here is straightforwardly 
consequentialist: inequality is unjust 
to the degree that it produces 
bad consequences, and should be 
reduced in order to decrease these 
bad consequences, but only to the 
extent that such inequality reductions 
actually decrease them without 
creating new bad consequences. 
None of these views indicate that 
any given level of income inequality is 
bad in itself. To say that a given level of 
inequality is unjust always implies further 
judgments, either about the process that 
produces the distribution of income, or 
about the connection between income 
and other social goods, or about the 
process through which income inequality 
produces bad outcomes. Can we, however, 
say something more about which of these 
views is most likely to be correct?
The first view – that inequality is bad 
so long as it is produced by an unfair set 
of rules for the allocation of the ‘benefits 
and burdens of cooperation’ (to use Rawls’ 
terminology) – is unobjectionable when 
stated abstractly. In theory, we would all 
agree that if an inequality is the result 
of injustice (e.g., because the rich have 
stolen the property of the poor) then it 
should be rectified. The problem concerns 
precisely the determination of which 
conditions make a system of allocation 
unfair, and here we might expect 
reasonable and well-disposed citizens in 
a democratic society to disagree in ways 
that cannot always be eliminated simply 
by the provision of more information 
(e.g., information about the injustice of 
certain rules or laws). This is because 
in any genuinely free large-scale society, 
citizens’ views of justice and the good life 
will be inescapably plural, even if they 
display some areas of agreement (what 
Rawls called an ‘overlapping consensus’); 
specifically, they will differ in crucial 
respects regarding the specific conditions 
that make a system of allocation unjust. 
(Even highly trained philosophers 
disagree about this, after all.)
For example, the more radical view 
of the ‘luck egalitarians’, namely, that 
market systems of allocation ultimately 
reward people for things they are not 
responsible for and hence produce 
outcomes that are systematically unjust, 
relies on a controversial view of what 
sorts of things we can ‘deserve’ or ‘be 
responsible’ for. While most people would 
agree with luck egalitarian philosophers 
that we do not ‘deserve’ the good parents 
or natural talents that may enable us to 
succeed monetarily ex ante (we were not 
responsible for having such parents), 
some philosophers argue (Schmidtz, 
2006) and many people would agree that 
we can come to deserve these opportunities 
ex post (by, for example, demonstrating 
a willingness to work hard and to make 
the best of our inherited talents and 
We should thus care about income inequality to 
the extent that it prevents the establishment of a 
society of equals: a society of people who cannot 
dominate one another, and hence can respect each 
other’s liberty.
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... increasing inequality might itself be evidence 
of an increasingly unfair system of distribution, or 
of increasing domination, but such judgments are 
ultimately dependent on moral intuitions about 
which citizens can and will reasonably disagree.
resources). I do not mean to argue this 
one way or the other. My point is that 
moral judgments about which rules of 
allocation are fair are ultimately subject to 
reasonable disagreement among citizens, 
and hence cannot be settled scientifically 
but must be settled politically: that is, 
through open-ended debate in the public 
sphere.
Wilkinson and Pickett at times seem to 
flirt with the idea that all forms of market 
allocation are unfair (e.g., pp.254-72), but 
this is not their main argument. Instead, 
they sometimes suggest that income 
inequality is a proxy for objectionable 
forms of status inequality and domination 
(see chapter 3). In this they echo (not 
necessarily intentionally) some influential 
political theorists (e.g. Anderson, 1999; 
Walzer, 1983) who argue that we should 
be concerned with income inequality as a 
matter of justice (in contrast to charity or 
humanitarian concern) not because we 
are interested in fixing the great ‘cosmic 
injustice’ of individual differences (which, 
in market systems, often translate into 
income differences), but because we are 
interested in not being oppressed and 
dominated and treated contemptuously 
by others. We should thus care about 
income inequality to the extent that it 
prevents the establishment of a society 
of equals: a society of people who cannot 
dominate one another, and hence can 
respect each other’s liberty. Such a society 
would have institutions that provide a 
‘decent minimum’ to all citizens – enough 
to take full advantage of their rights and 
liberties – and would prevent income 
from turning into political and other 
forms of degrading social power, but 
not necessarily limit income inequality 
per se; for theorists like Anderson, envy 
is not a compelling reason to engage in 
redistribution, even if it produced stress 
and other bad health effects.6 
This view was perhaps most clearly 
articulated by the philosopher Michael 
Walzer in his book Spheres of Justice 
(Walzer, 1983). Walzer argued that social 
life produces many goods (income, 
education, political power, social status, 
etc) in many spheres of life, each of which 
is distributed in culturally specific ways. 
We give political power to the persuasive, 
primary and secondary education to all, 
university degrees to the academically 
qualified, and so on. The important 
point is that each of these goods has their 
own criteria for distribution, criteria that 
are themselves subject to discussion in a 
democratic society and cannot be simply 
imposed. Problems arise when the goods 
that should be distributed according to a 
particular criterion of distribution (e.g., 
academic merit or persuasiveness) are 
distributed according to another (e.g., 
income). This results in the domination 
of one good (income or political power, 
for example) over the rest, transforming a 
society which may contain multiple non-
overlapping spheres of distribution, some 
hierarchical and some not, into a single 
hierarchy.
Genuine equality thus depends on 
preventing illegitimate ‘border crossings’ 
– preventing money from turning into 
political power, or political power into 
money, or education into social status, 
and so on – according to the current 
understanding of what the proper 
boundaries of each sphere are: in an equal 
society, the rich are not simultaneously 
always the most educated, the most 
healthy, the most powerful, and so on.7 To 
be sure, one can certainly imagine that, 
as income differentials increase, money 
is translated more easily into power 
and dominating social status, so that an 
egalitarian society will have a permanent 
interest in reducing income differentials. 
Yet we are often not actually interested 
in the specifics of income equality or 
inequality (at least to the extent that we 
are not simply motivated by envy), but 
in not being dominated by those with 
money and in retaining our self-respect 
as equal citizens: income inequality is 
especially resented when it is clearly 
transformed into unequal treatment 
by the law, for example. By the same 
token, we can be reasonably wary of 
interventions to limit income inequality, 
especially if they are designed in obscure 
and bureaucratic ways that enhance 
the discretionary power of government 
officials or push status competition into 
other spheres. If reducing the importance 
of income as a marker of status merely 
increases the importance of admission 
to a good university (as seems to be 
the case in Japan or France, where the 
top political and business positions are 
monopolised by graduates of a handful of 
top universities), this is not necessarily a 
gain from the point of view of this sort of 
egalitarianism, even if it is accompanied 
by better outcomes for certain health and 
social problems.8 
Wilkinson and Pickett nevertheless 
argue that freedom and equality 
are perfectly compatible (pp.263-4) 
and suggest that ‘equality’ is simply 
another name for democracy. Yet their 
understanding of freedom is itself 
one that reasonable and well-disposed 
citizens may disagree with. An alternative 
conception of what liberty requires 
is perhaps most clearly articulated by 
Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia (Nozick, 1974). Nozick 
argued, among other things, that it is a 
mistake to conceive of economic systems 
as places where we should get what we 
deserve; we instead should get what we 
choose, subject to the proviso that the 
choice is in fact genuine and not coerced. 
A fair distribution of income is not one 
that gives everyone what they deserve 
(as the luck egalitarians would argue), 
and certainly not one that preserves a 
particular pattern of distribution (e.g., a 
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certain level of inequality), but the one 
that would emerge from the (genuinely 
free) choices of individuals engaged in 
mutually beneficial exchanges with one 
another of things they can legitimately 
own, and that neither the state nor anyone 
else has a right to simply take from us, 
unless we have explicitly agreed to give 
them up. This idea can clearly be taken 
too far (for one thing, the ‘genuinely free’ 
proviso, as well as the question of what 
we can be said to own, are both difficult 
to specify and subject to reasonable 
disagreement), and there are many 
critiques of Nozick (Francis and Francis, 
1976; Fried, 1995; Gregori, 1979; Nagel, 
1975; Nock, 1992). My point is only that 
Nozick draws on a deep moral intuition 
about the importance of choice and 
ownership in a free society which resonates 
deeply with many citizens and cannot be 
simply attributed to their being ‘deceived’ 
about their true interests in a more equal 
distribution of income and wealth. To the 
extent that redistributive policies violate 
this intuition – that we are free people 
entitled to make choices about mutually 
beneficial exchanges and to keep what we 
have legitimately acquired – they will be 
subject to reasonable disagreement. From 
this point of view, again, the ‘appropriate’ 
level of inequality cannot be determined 
scientifically, but must result, in a 
democratic society, from the free play of 
arguments about the relative importance 
of free choice and ownership vis-à-vis 
other considerations.
Is there, finally, a purely consequen-
tialist case for reducing inequality? 
Wilkinson and Pickett would argue that 
there is, in view of the health and so-
cial problems that inequality produces. 
It would certainly be good to be able to 
produce healthier and happier societies, 
and this sort of argument can potentially 
move the public conversation in more 
egalitarian directions. But the question of 
whether a more income-equal society is 
better cannot ultimately be settled by sci-
entific evidence alone, even if it were ir-
refutable (which it is not, despite Wilkin-
son and Pickett’s rhetoric). One might be 
reasonably wary of saying that we should 
engage in large-scale redistribution just 
because we might gain a little health and 
happiness without further evidence that 
current arrangements are in fact unfair 
or result in domination, and that mea-
sures to reduce inequality would not have 
a negative impact on other goods that we 
care about. To be sure, as I stressed above, 
increasing inequality might itself be evi-
dence of an increasingly unfair system 
of distribution, or of increasing domina-
tion, but such judgments are ultimately 
dependent on moral intuitions about 
which citizens can and will reasonably 
disagree. Moreover, an excessive focus 
on income inequality obscures the com-
plexity of the egalitarian ideal, as we have 
seen: other inequalities may often matter 
more than income inequality. And finally, 
an excessive focus on income inequality 
runs the risk of belittling other important 
goods that matter to us, like choice and 
ownership.9 The consequentialist frame is 
too thin to hang the argument for equal-
ity on. 
Conclusion: income inequality and 
democracy
In a democratic society, views about 
the proper extent of inequality will 
necessarily differ, since they are based 
on contestable intuitions about what 
constitutes domination, what we ‘deserve’ 
and what kinds of exchanges we should 
be free to conduct. To be sure, some of 
these views can be influenced by the 
powerful; in societies like our own that 
are not ideally egalitarian this is always a 
possibility. But it is a mistake to think that 
the reason our society is not as egalitarian 
as (some of us) might like is simply that 
nefarious interests prevent the people 
from understanding their ‘true’ interests. 
Some of the frustration with earlier, 
perhaps more egalitarian, incarnations 
of the welfare state that is evident in the 
current political climate is attributable to 
less-than-noble feelings, but some of it 
is based on real intuitions about what it 
means to be an equal citizen. To argue for 
income equality is to enter a conversation 
where there is much potential for 
disappointment: our arguments may fail 
to convince. 
1 Wilkinson and Pickett focus on income inequality (rather 
than, for example, wealth inequality) in part due to data 
availability reasons, but also because they believe that 
income inequality is a good proxy for the forms of status 
hierarchy that determine the health and social outcomes they 
are interested in (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010, pp.26-9).
2 Communist countries include Bulgaria, China, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia,	Hungary,	Poland,	Romania,	the	Soviet	Union	
and Yugoslavia. Rich countries include Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece,	Hong	Kong,	Ireland,	Israel,	Italy,	Japan,	The	
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK and USA. Data 
is from Deininger and Squire (1996). I have produced a 
scatterplot of these data here: http://public.tableausoftware.
com/workbooks/Trendsinincomeinequality.
3	 Portugal	and	Hungary	had	roughly	the	same	measured	real	
GDP per capita until the late 1980s (somewhere between 
$11,000 and $10,000), according to the Penn World Table 
v.6.3	(Heston,	Summers	and	Aten,	2009).	Most	communist	
societies also had relatively high life expectancies and 
literacy levels and low levels of ordinary violent crime. 
4 This is complicated by the fact that people seem to 
underestimate the actual degree of income and wealth 
inequality in many societies (Osberg and Smeeding, 
2006; Norton and Ariely, 2011), and even when they 
think inequality is excessive they may fail to connect these 
perceptions with public policy (Bartels, 2005). On the 
other hand, if people underestimate the actual degree of 
income and wealth inequality in society, perhaps because 
consumption inequality is actually lower than income 
inequality, as some evidence suggests at least in the case of 
the USA (Krueger and Perri, 2006; for a non-technical survey 
with further citations, see Wilkinson, 2009), this should tend 
to mitigate the kinds of status competition that Wilkinson 
and Pickett identify as causes of health and social problems.
5 It should be noted that even luck egalitarians are prepared to 
accept some degree of income inequality (even a very large 
degree, in fact) if it can be shown to be due to actions that 
the individual is truly responsible for (e.g., well-informed 
gambles, starting from a position of equality, may well have 
different results: the resulting inequality in income would 
thus be justified). 
6 In a response to critics of her seminal 1999 article (‘What is 
the point of equality?’), Anderson notes that ‘although there 
is a spectacular wealth difference between my family and Bill 
Gates’ family, my family enjoys such a fully satisfactory level 
of prosperity that I think only considerations of envy could 
motivate resentment on my part of Gates’ superior wealth.  
I see no morally compelling reason to worry about wealth 
disparities between the prosperous middle class and the 
super-rich, provided the super-rich don’t use their wealth to 
undermine democracy – for example, by buying elections – or 
to oppress other people’ (Anderson, 1999). 
7 There are some problems with Walzer’s proposals regarding 
the possibility of what he calls ‘complex equality,’ but 
discussing them would take us too far afield (Arneson, 1995; 
Hartogh,	1999;	Mayer,	2001;	van	der	Veen,	1999).
8 Saunders (2010) notes, rightly in my view, that Japanese 
society should be more of a puzzle for the Wilkinson and 
Pickett thesis: this is a society that is highly hierarchical and 
very status conscious, even though it is income-equal. But if 
status competition were the key driver of health and social 
problems in a society, we would expect Japan to have more 
of such problems. Saunders attributes good health outcomes 
in Japan to a ‘collectivist’ culture.
9 Wilkinson and Pickett often suggest that if we are concerned 
with inequality, we must give up on economic growth, 
caricaturing economic growth in advanced societies as if it 
merely produced environmental wastelands full of unhappy 
consumerists (e.g., pp.224-33). But economic growth 
may in fact produce ‘moral’ (Friedman, 2005) and even 
environmental benefits, and to the extent that there is a 
trade-off between growth and equality (which is unclear), 
it needs to be confronted, not assumed to work always in 
favour of equality.
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